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Chapter 8
Back to the Future: Hybrid Co-operative
Pensions and the TIAA-CREF System
Benjamin Goodman and David P. Richardson
Over the past 30 years, defined contribution (DC) plans have emerged as
the primary employment-based retirement program for millions of US
workers.1 DC plans provide covered workers with substantial latitude in
determining whether to participate, how much salary to contribute, how
to invest assets, and how to take distributions from the plans. As participa-
tion in DC plans has grown, more households bear increased responsibility
for managing the various risks to their retirement savings. A growing body of
research finds that many DC plan participants have difficulty making deci-
sions that maximize their chances of achieving retirement security. For
example, workers may make poor retirement plan decisions because they
are prone to behavioral biases or have low financial literacy.2 Policymakers
recently began enacting changes to the DC plan system with the goal of
reducing the chances of participants making systematic mistakes. Major
changes enacted as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 included
new rules for qualified plan default provisions that were designed to
increase worker participation, achieve a minimum rate of retirement con-
tributions, and provide automatic investment diversification. These changes
focused on helping households manage risk during the accumulation
phase, but they provided no guidance for the distribution phase of these
retirement plans.
As the US population ages, there is a need to ensure that retirement
programs can carry individuals not just to, but also through, retirement. This
has resulted in renewed interest in plan designs that include guaranteed
income options to help households manage various retirement income
risks. Among the ideas being considered, policymakers are requiring default
(or mandatory) annuity features and encouraging the expanded use of
hybrid plan designs.
This chapter provides an overview of how TIAA-CREF, a Fortune 100
financial services company providing retirement services to the non-profit
and public sectors, incorporates features of a co-operative hybrid pension
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/12/2015, SPi
into retirement plan design. We define a co-operative pension as a retire-
ment plan that distributes all assets (net of operating costs) to system
participants over time. A hybrid pension combines elements of both a
defined contribution (DC) plan and a defined benefit (DB) plan. The
TIAA-CREF system combines a DC structure during the accumulation
phase, with workers allocating contributions to investment choices that
include mutual funds and deferred fixed and variable annuities; a DB
structure during retirement by providing the option to annuitize part (or
all) of retirement assets; and a co-operative structure for individuals who
participate in the fixed annuity component over their working and retired
lives.
In what follows, we first provide a brief overview of the TIAA-CREF system.
Next we discuss how TIAA Traditional, a guaranteed fixed annuity, and
the CREF variable annuity work, and we discuss past performance. We
then review some recent data on participant experience. A final section
concludes.
The Basics of TIAA-CREF
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association—College Retirement Equities
Fund (TIAA–CREF) is multi-faceted financial services organization offering
a range of pension, IRA, life insurance, brokerage, financial guidance and
advice, wealth management, banking, endowment, and planned giving
services. Here we focus on the structure of core pension business which
serves over 3.9 million individuals and more than 15,000 institutional cli-
ents.3 Many institutions offer at least two plans—a primary plan (which may
accept only employer contributions), and a supplemental plan (which
typically accepts only employee contributions). Because TIAA-CREF serves
the non-profit and public sector markets, some institutions are subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) while others are not.
Numerous sources provide information on corporate structure, govern-
ance, and risk management aspects of TIAA-CREF.4 Our focus in this
chapter is how the system impacts participant outcomes.
Participants in the TIAA-CREF system choose from amenu of investments
when building their retirement portfolios. Table 8.1 provides information
on the asset classes and investment choices available to participants as of
December 31, 2013; it also documents the rapid growth in the investment
choice set over the past 20 years. Participants can also invest in one guaran-
teed asset, the TIAA Traditional annuity. This asset class was the genesis of
TIAA in 1918; it provides a guarantee of principal, a guaranteed interest
rate, and additional declared dividends in excess of the guaranteed rate.5 In
1952, CREF became the first organization to offer a variable annuity when it
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introduced the CREF stock account. This account allowed participants to
directly purchase (and bear the associated investment risks of) an equity
asset class within their retirement plans. In 1988, CREF began offering a
fixed income asset class with the introduction of the CREF Money Market
account. A fourth asset class—balanced—was added in 1990 with the intro-
duction of the CREF Social Choice fund.6 The TIAA Real Estate fund in
1995 introduced a fifth asset class—real estate. As shown in Table 8.1, a
number of additional equity, fixed income, real estate, and balanced asset
class fund options have been added to the investment menu thereafter.
table 8.1 TIAA-CREF asset classes, inception dates, and total assets under
management for TIAA-CREF pension accounts and mutual funds, as of December
31, 2013
Asset Class and
Investment Account Date of Inception
Assets 
($ mil.) % of Total
Guaranteed
TIAA Traditional April 23, 1918 259,504 43.8
Equity
CREF Stock July 1, 1952 126,458
39.4
CREF Global Equities March 1, 1990 19,128
CREF Growth April 29, 1994 19,409
CREF Equity Index April 29, 1994 15,858
TIAA-CREF Equity Mutual 
Funds (21) October 1, 2002 52,478
Fixed Income
CREF Money Market April 1, 1988 11,979
8.2
CREF Bond Market March 1, 1990 13,078
CREF Inflation Linked Bond May 1, 1997 7,644
TIAA-CREF Fixed Income 
Mutual Funds (9) March 31, 2006 16,006
Real Estate
TIAA Real Estate October 2, 1995 16,908
TIAA-CREF Real Estate 
Securities Mutual Fund October 1, 2002 1,286
Multi-Asset
CREF Social Choice March 1, 1990 13,341
5.5
Lifecycle funds (10) October 15, 2004 18,203
Lifestyle funds (5) December 9, 2011 243
TIAA-CREF Managed Allocation 
Mutual Fund March 31, 2006 710
3.1
Notes :
a) All variable products reported on the SEC (net) assets reporting basis.
b) The data sources for this table includes all pension, retirement class, and institutional class
mutual fund assets and the totals are different from the following information which
summarizes data for premium-paying TIAA-CREF participants in primary plans only.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Notable among these were the introduction of the CREF inflation-linked
bond fund (1997), retirement class mutual funds (2002), and the target-
date series of life cycle mutual funds in 2004. In 2013, TIAA-CREF offered a
total of 57 investment options across five different asset classes, divided
about 39 percent in equity and 61 percent in non-equity asset classes.
At retirement, participants have a menu of distribution options available
for converting assets into retirement income. For instance, they have access
to a full menu of annuity options including fixed and variable, single and
joint, standard and graded, various length guaranteed (or certainty)
periods, transfer payout, and interest-only payments. Participants may also
take systematic withdrawals, lump-sum payments, or required minimum
distributions. The flexibility of the distribution menu allows participants to
customize their retirement incomes to suit their consumption and estate
planning needs.
Prior to 1988, however, the TIAA-CREF system could be characterized as a
co-operative hybrid retirement plan. The hybrid component was facilitated
through a plan design that required defined contributions to be allocated to
units of deferred annuities; at retirement, participants converted these
assets into a lifetime income benefit stream. The co-operative component
was associated with a system design that distributed all assets (net of operat-
ing costs) to participants over time. Though the firm no longer requires the
conversion of assets into lifetime annuities, the co-operative arrangement
remains in place for participants choosing to utilize annuities. In what
follows, we describe how TIAA and CREF work and show how the two
products remain an integral part of many participants’ retirement income
plans.
TIAA Traditional
The TIAA Traditional annuity is a guaranteed fixed annuity product that
can be purchased while working or in retirement by investing in deferred
TIAA annuity units through an employment-based retirement plan. The
overall concept of ‘investing’ in TIAA is quite simple during a participant’s
working life. Contributions are made by a participant (or on behalf of the
participant by his/her employer).7 Each contribution has a guaranteed
lifetime minimum rate of return based on the month and year in which
the contribution is made. For most of our participants, this guaranteed
minimum rate is 3 percent.8 All TIAA participants are thus guaranteed
(subject to TIAA meeting its claim-paying ability) to have an account bal-
ance that continually grows at the stated minimum rate. In addition, in any
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year the TIAA Trustees declare that ‘additional amounts’ will be credited to
participant accounts, this in effect provides an interest rate greater than the
guaranteed minimum rate.
A participant (or surviving spouse, partner, or beneficiary) has the right
but not the obligation to turn the accumulated units of TIAA into a stream
of lifetime income. The decision to contractually convert into lifetime
income typically happens upon retirement, although it can occur at later
ages. Similar to the accumulation phase, the TIAA annuity contract has a
guaranteed minimum payout rate; the TIAA trustees can declare additional
amounts to increase the total payment beyond this minimum guarantee on
an annual basis. A full menu of annuity choices is available and includes
options for single or joint life, standard or graded, and certainty periods of
various lengths.9 If a participant chooses not to take a lifetime annuity, other
income options are available, such as receiving interest-only payments,
taking the Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) amounts, or opting for
an annuity certain. The accumulated balance can also be transferred out of
TIAA in roughly equal-sized periodic payments using a Transfer Payout
Annuity (TPA), with the transferred amounts moved into other TIAA-
CREF investments or taken out of the system, though the latter may depend
on employer-specific plan rules.10
While the concepts behind TIAA are simple, features of the system make
including a TIAA deferred annuity in an investment portfolio somewhat
complex. First, every year for the last half century, the TIAA trustees have
declared additional amounts for both the accumulation and the payout
rates. For this reason, participants and advisers who considered only the
minimum guarantee would have underweighted the expected return con-
tribution on the product. Second, TIAA has a unique ‘vintage’ system that
applies different crediting rates to marginal accumulations based on the
time of original contribution. Thus, the total return earned on total contri-
butions is unique to each individual’s history of contributions. Third, there
is typically limited liquidity and cashability for TIAA accumulations held in
employer-sponsored retirement plans, which limits the ability to rebalance
one’s portfolio. Each of these features is addressed in what follows.
TIAA crediting rates during the accumulation phase
Participants can purchase TIAA deferred annuity units through their retire-
ment plan by allocating part of their contributions to them, or by transfer-
ring other retirement assets into the product. Accumulated TIAA units earn
a lifetime guaranteed minimum rate of return that is determined by the
type of retirement plan contract. For many participants, this guaranteed
minimum is 3 percent, though more recent plan contracts have adopted a
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year-to-year floating guaranteed rate of at least 1 percent and at most
3 percent.11 For the past few decades, actual credit rates have been much
higher than the guaranteed minimums specified in plan contracts.
Figure 8.1 shows the average crediting rate earned by units in illiquid
employer-based contracts over the past 50 years.
Figure 8.1 shows that the average crediting rate has been generally posi-
tively correlated with long-term nominal interest rates, but not with infla-
tion. The crediting rate increased as interest rates rose from the 1960s
through the 1970s, and the reverse has occurred over the past three dec-
ades. Note also that the TIAA crediting rates have exceeded 3 percent for
over 40 years, sometimes substantially, and the TIAA crediting rate has also
exceeded the rate of inflation for decades.12 This pattern of crediting rates is
due to the long term nature of the underlying portfolio investments, the
insurer’s ability to buy and hold investments (especially government bonds),
the size of the general account (which helps facilitate investment in alter-
native assets), and low expenses.
When a participant is credited with earnings on his existing TIAA assets,
his new accumulation receives the same guaranteed minimum rate. As a
simple example, suppose a participant makes a one-time allocation of $100
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to TIAA and has a plan contract with a guaranteed minimum rate of
3 percent. After 10 years, the minimum accumulation would be $134.39.
If instead, during the first year, the actual crediting rate was 5 percent,
then after 10 years the guaranteed minimum accumulation would be
$137.13 The additional 2 percent earned in the first year is guaranteed
once it has been earned.
As an illustration using historical returns, assume a participant made a
one-time allocation to TIAA of $100 on January 1, 1984 and had a plan
contract with a guaranteed minimum crediting rate of 3 percent. A thirty-
year projection of his guaranteed minimum accumulation as of January 1,
2014 would have been $242.73. But when we apply the actual crediting rates
to this participant’s TIAA accumulations, the actual amount accumulated
was $846.61, an amount nearly 3.5 times larger than the guaranteed min-
imum. Of course, past performance is no guarantee of future results, so if
today’s low interest rate environment persists into the foreseeable future,
there is a strong likelihood that a 2044 actual accumulation from a one-time
$100 contribution in 2014 will result in a smaller total return. Nevertheless, it
is important to understand that considering only the guaranteed minimum
accumulation rate of 3 percent likely understates the potential value of
investing in a TIAA account.
Another important aspect of investing in TIAA is the lack of downside
volatility in the participant’s total return. When market interest rates rise or
fall, bond holders can experience portfolio gains or losses to their total
returns because of the interaction between interest rates and bond prices.
By contrast, TIAA participants always earn a positive return because the
interest rate risk is managed within the TIAA general account. This lack of
participant downside investment risk compares favorably to other ‘safe’
fixed income investments—namely bond funds—that are required to dis-
tribute capital gains and losses to participants. Figure 8.2 compares the past
30 years of monthly returns in TIAA with the Barclays Aggregate Bond Fund
returns.14 The bond funds had negative monthly returns about 30 percent
of the time over the sample period. The likelihood of short-term negative
bond returns is a particularly important consideration for older workers
nearing retirement who seek to rebalance their portfolios away from equi-
ties and toward fixed income products. Using this strategy in a rising interest
rate environment may have near-retirees bearing excessive interest rate risk
relative to an alternative strategy of holding TIAA. This is because the latter
pools the risk within a general account which is not required to distribute
capital losses to participants.
Table 8.2 provides additional evidence of the advantages of pooling
investment risk across participants within the TIAA general account. The
average return performance of TIAA and the Barclays aggregate give the
appearance of similar performance across various time periods. Taking
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table 8.2 Average return performance of TIAA and the Barclays
Aggregate
5 years 10 years 20 years 30 years
TIAA Traditional
Average return (%) 4.5 4.3 5.9 7.4
# of negative months 0 0 0 0
Sharpe ratio 2.0
Barclays Aggregate Bond
Average return (%) 4.3 4.4 5.6 7.5
# of negative months 17 38 77 106
Sharpe ratio 0.3
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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into account the funds’ volatility (as shown in Figure 8.2), however, indicates
that participants bear substantially more risk in the bond funds compared
to TIAA. The Barclays aggregate had negative returns in about 30 percent
of the months, compared to zero negative months for TIAA. The difference
in Sharpe ratios highlights the additional risk to participants within the
bond fund, as compared to the accumulations held in the TIAA general
account.
Contributions and the TIAA vintage system
An unusual feature of the TIAA Traditional annuity is its vintage system for
crediting returns that participants earn on their contributions. Generally
speaking, the vintage system exists because TIAA is structured as a non-
profit ‘co-operative’ annuity with a long-term investment horizon. When a
participant contributes to TIAA Traditional, assets are purchased to back
the total lifetime expected impact of that contribution. Contributions made
at different points in time (called ‘vintages’) can therefore earn different
crediting rates, because assets backing the various vintages of contributions
will tend to have different rates of return.
This vintage system can make it difficult for some to understand their total
TIAA returns, because most participants contribute to the fund over their
working lives and not as a simple lump-sum at a point in time. As a result,
most TIAA participants tend to have accumulations in many different vin-
tages, so their overall average return is a blend of the returns to the various
vintages.15 The vintage system is akin to a co-operative pension, in that all
the participants of a particular vintage ‘own’ the underlying vintage assets
and share in their returns.
Table 8.3 provides a hypothetical example of how the vintage system
contributes to a participant’s TIAA returns. The total average return in
the table is calculated as the weighted average of the accumulations attrib-
utable to each of the various vintages. For most contracts, interest earnings
table 8.3 Weighted average of yearly accumulations and interest
earnings by vintage
Vintage Accumulation Interest rate (%)
2000–2007 15,555 4.25
2008 10,234 5.00
2009 9,479 4.50
2010–2013 12,905 3.75
Total 48,173 4.32
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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above the 3 percent guarantee are placed in the new vintage, so the average
interest earned on total accumulations can thus change on a daily basis.
The TIAA vintage system was created to treat participants fairly relative to
their tenure within the system. The alternative of using a single total portfolio
rate might drive down returns for existing participants when interest rates fall,
and by necessity it would require reduced newmoney rates when interest rates
rise. The vintage system reduces exposure to this type of interest rate risk.
The ‘co-operative’ characteristics of the vintage system extend through
the accumulation phase into retirement, so they can also affect the annuity
settlement crediting rate.16 This is because the settlement rate will reflect
the various vintages of investment experience, as well as an additional
amount from the return of unneeded contingency reserves.17 Given
TIAA’s non-profit co-operative annuity structure, when the contingency
reserves are no longer needed, the firm distributes them to the participants
who helped generate them. Absent unusual circumstances, the longer a
participant has assets in TIAA, the higher the payout rate, because the older
vintages have larger contingency reserves. Table 8.4 illuminates this concept
by showing current payout rates by vintage.
Two important features of the TIAA system are worth emphasizing. First,
the comparison of vintages to ‘new money’ rates shows the difference in
payout rates that a long-term participant in TIAA receives, compared to
someone who converts other retirement assets into a TIAA annuity on the
contract settlement date. For example, a long-term participant annuitizing
assets with vintages from 1990 to 2008 would have a payout rate of between
7.19 percent and 9.73 percent, depending on the timing of his contribu-
tions. By contrast, a person converting retirement assets into a TIAA annuity
today would receive the ‘new money’ rate of 6.5 percent. Second, partici-
pants cannot pick and choose which vintages they want to sell or annuitize—
all decisions are pro-rata across various vintages to deter participants from
gaming the system when interest rates change. Continuing the previous
example, if a long-term participant annuitizes half his TIAA assets, then
the crediting rate is weighted pro-rata across his various vintages.
table 8.4 Current payout rate by vintage
Vintage Payout Rate at Age 65 (%)
Pre-1992 9.73
1992–1997 7.72
1998–2008 7.19
2009–2013 6.33–7.01
New Money 6.50
Average Policyholder 7.60
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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TIAA annuity payout rates
Participants choose if, when, how, and how much they annuitize from their
holdings of TIAA assets. A participant may decide he does not need to
annuitize any retirement wealth and so can continue holding TIAA assets
through retirement. Alternatively, he can take interest-only payments, allow
Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) rules to generate payments, or
convert those assets using a Transfer Payout Annuity (TPA).18 For those
choosing annuitization, a full range of choices is available including options
for single versus joint life, standard versus graded, and a range of guarantee
options. Once a participant decides when, how, and how much to annuitize,
his TIAA assets are converted into an annuity payment stream using the
current applicable annuity payout rate. Given the vintage system described
above, this rate is likely to be unique to each participant.
TIAA provides a guaranteed minimum payout defined in terms of
expected lifetime income. Expressing the payout as income per $1,000 of
TIAA accumulation, most contracts currently have an age 65 minimum
guarantee of $4.11 of monthly lifetime income, or over $49 per year. TIAA
has also historically credited additional amounts to the payout rate. For
example, as of January 1, 2014, the initial income per $1,000 on ‘new
money’ at age 65 was $5.54 a month, or over $66 per year. All of these
payments are stated as rates, with the guaranteed minimum payout rate
equal to 4.93 percent and the ‘new money’ payout rate equal to 6.6 percent.
As is well known, annuity payout rates vary depending on several factors,
including an annuitant’s age, annuity option elected, and the current inter-
est rate. Table 8.5 provides examples of current payout rates. Participants
annuitizing at younger ages, those choosing two-life annuities, and/or those
electing a certainty or guarantee period (e.g. a life annuity that also includes
a guaranteed minimum number of payments) will receive a lower payout
rate compared to older annuitants and those opting for a single life annuity
table 8.5 Current payout rates by age
Single Joint and
100%
No guarantee 20 year
guarantee
No
guarantee
Age 55 Age 65 Age 75 Age 65 Ages 65
Payout rate 5.50 6.60 8.90 6.00 5.70
Guaranteed Minimum
rate
4.10 4.90 6.40 4.70 4.30
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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with no guarantee period. While the payout rate will differ based on these
factors, the expected total lifetime benefit will be roughly equal across ages
and options. By contrast, differences in the current interest environment at
the time of retirement can result in different payout rates and different
expected lifetime benefits. For example, while the current new money
payout rate for an age 65 annuitant is 6.5 percent, many years ago it was
quite a bit higher, hitting a peak of about 14 percent in the early 1980s.
One challenge in explaining the annuitization decision process is that,
unlike with mutual fund investments, there is no single ‘price’ for annuities.
That is, the guaranteed minimum interest rate is known, but the partici-
pant’s actual payout rate depends on age, option, and interest, plus the
additional impact on the rate from the vintage system and additional cred-
ited amounts. Because these additional amounts are not guaranteed, a
prospective annuitant retiree will not know his/her actual income per
$1,000 accumulation until very close to the settlement date. Furthermore,
the additional amounts can change, even for those who have already turned
their accumulations into lifetime income. Figure 8.3 shows that TIAA has
declared numerous increases to post-annuitization payout rates to annuit-
ants in different cohorts. As Figure 8.3 shows, initial income per $100,000
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has varied over the past 20 years.19 Notably, there were no reductions since
1993, even though this period included the 2001 recession and the 2008
financial crisis.
Combining accumulation and payout features:
A hybrid co-op pension product
We have characterized TIAA as a co-op hybrid pension product based on its
features and structure. TIAA has a DC component because participants
allocate retirement contributions to TIAA over their working lives and
accumulate units of a deferred guaranteed fixed annuity. The vintage
system has features of a co-operative pension because of TIAA’s non-profit
annuity structure—meaning that the risk pooling, returns, and board deci-
sions on the distribution of underlying no-longer-needed contingency re-
serves is proportional to the accumulated shares owned by each vintage
cohort. Likewise, the guaranteed minimum crediting and payout rates
during the accumulation and payout phases, respectively, provide a co-
operative structure for distributing returns and income from system assets
while effectively pooling market risk. At retirement, the features of the
participating annuity options provide a minimum level defined benefit
pension with a high likelihood of receiving additional amounts.
Design complexity is an issue for this type of product within a retirement
plan investment menu. A growing body of research indicates that individuals
face both behavioral and financial literacy hurdles when making retirement
decisions, and complexity can be a major driver of poor decision-making.20
Research also indicates that low annuitization rates can be partially
explained by behavioral biases.21 For example, prospect theory indicates
that, after working a lifetime and accumulating retirement wealth, retirees
may have a difficult time writing a big check from their accounts to receive a
series of small checks in the form of annuity income. Including hybrid
pension products in the investment menu (in the form of deferred fixed
annuities) can help participants overcome this behavioral bias, by encour-
aging them to allocate contributions to the deferred annuity over time to
receive a series of larger checks in retirement. Guaranteed minimums can
also help with loss aversion, because every contribution is guaranteed
to grow at a minimum rate and produce income for lifetime retirement
income at that minimum rate. Other features, such as the vintage system
and allocation of additional amounts, should increase demand for these
products, yet they also add complexity. So while research in behavioral
finance and financial literacy has improved plan design during the accumu-
lation phase, much work remains to be done with respect to the distribution
phase.
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A simple example highlights the challenges. No precise projection of
future lifetime benefits from TIAA is available, but a rough estimate can
be calculated using today’s crediting and payout rates. For example, at age
35, a one-time $100 contribution is guaranteed to increase to $243 by age 65.
With a guaranteed minimum payout rate of 4.9 percent, this one-time
contribution will generate at least $12 in annual income as a single life
annuity. A more realistic example estimates the guaranteed income benefit
received starting at age 65, assuming level contributions of $100 monthly
over 30 years. Applying the current guaranteed minimum guaranteed rates
results in about $2,842, while applying average current rates would imply
about $4,347 in annual income.
This simple example shows that including this type of hybrid product in a
retirement plan could nudge participants to focus on retirement outcomes,
rather than simply wealth accumulation. Advice engines can provide differ-
ent outcome metrics under a variety of other assumptions. For example, by
assuming a contribution equal to a fixed percentage of salary, one can
describe the final benefit as a replacement rate (projected benefit divided
by final salary), using either the minimum guaranteed interest and payout
rates, or current rates (or even historical average TIAA rates).
Another advantage of this type of hybrid product is that the guaranteed
minimum income floor allows participants to customize their retirement
investment portfolios to seek higher returns (and more risk), or to reduce
total risk exposure by allocating more assets to a higher income floor. The
flexibility of distributions in retirement is also a feature. Participants have
the right but not the obligation to convert their accumulations into lifetime
income. Participants are free to use their accumulations in any way they
choose, subject to contractual limits. For example, a participant in poor
health might not want to annuitize, might choose a joint life annuity to
provide for a spouse or partner, or might choose a single life annuity with a
guarantee period to ensure assets revert to the estate in case of an early
death.
The CREF Variable Annuity
CREF became the first commercially offered variable annuity product in the
US in 1952, with an intuitive and simple design concept.22 During the
accumulation phase, CREF investments appear to perform similar to mutual
fund investments. Participants who allocate contributions to CREF purchase
fractional shares (units) of a basket of underlying assets. The daily share
value changes, based on the performance of the assets held in the fund. But
there is a key difference between CREF and mutual funds: while mutual
funds have capital gain distributions and/or pay dividends, the declared
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amount is used to add to the participant’s number of shares owned. In
CREF, the units are valued daily and any gains or dividends are added to
the unit value.
As shown in Table 8.1, there are currently eight different CREF accounts.
The first was the CREF Stock account, which provides a broadly diversified
basket of equities with foreign and domestic stocks (large and small cap),
and combines both active and passive management. Other accounts include
an Index fund, Growth account, Global account, Bond fund, Inflation-
Linked Bond fund, Social Choice fund, and a Money Market account.
Participants are free to choose any allocation to these accounts, as well as
TIAA Traditional, TIAA Real Estate, or any other mutual funds included in
the plan sponsor’s menu.
Another difference between CREF and a mutual fund is that, in the
payout phase, the CREF participant has the right but not the obligation to
convert his accumulations into a stream of lifetime income. Similar to TIAA,
participants choose if, when, how, and how much of their CREF accumula-
tions to annuitize. Participants may take non-annuity distributions similar to
mutual funds or lump-sum or systematic withdrawals (there may be limits
based on plan rules), or instead they can simply draw down their accumu-
lations based on the Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) rules.
A unique feature of the CREF payout annuity is that it offers post-
settlement asset allocation choices. Conversion from one CREF annuity to
another CREF annuity and/or to a TIAA annuity is permitted. Thus if an
annuitant wants to ‘lock in’ gains after a good year, or simply wants to reduce
or increase the risk of his annuity payment stream, he can transfer some or
all of his assets across accounts. Accordingly, the participant can collect
payments for life.
One consequence of purchasing a variable annuity is that the retiree does
not know from payment to payment how much income he will receive from
the annuity. This uncertainty must be balanced against the possibility of
achieving greater investment returns than those promised by a fixed annu-
ity. In essence, CREF (or any variable annuity) provides an instrument for
those who seek the security of lifetime income and also wish to participate in
the equity and/or bond markets.
The size of life annuity payment per $1,000 of assets converted will
depend, among other factors, on the annuitant’s age at settlement, how
long he is expected to live from that age (single or joint mortality), and an
assumed investment return (AIR). In the case of a fixed annuity like TIAA,
the insurer has a high degree of confidence in what the underlying invest-
ments are expected to earn, so the payment calculation is straightforward.
By contrast, expectations are less certain regarding what assets will earn in a
CREF variable annuity. This is because the equity market may be bullish or
bearish, and interest rates may rise or fall. CREF uses a 4 percent AIR to
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calculate the initial annuity payment and then each year (or month for
those who choose to revalue their payments monthly), the payment is
adjusted by comparing the 4 percent AIR with the actual return earned. If
the CREF funds earn more than 4 percent, the payment is increased; if the
fund earn less than 4 percent, the payment decreases. CREF may also adjust
the annuity payment based on changes in system expenses, group mortality,
or other factors (these have been very minor over time).
Some might ask why CREF uses a 4 percent AIR, and the answer is not
simple. Part of the explanation is that the firm seeks to reduce potential
volatility of participant outcomes based on past market experience. If CREF
used a lower AIR, it would result in a lower initial payment, but participants
would be more likely to receive increases and those increases would tend to
be larger. Using a higher AIR would result in high initial payments, but it
would also bring a greater likelihood of subsequent decreases in payments.
Consider a 65 year-old participant with a contract for a CREF single life
annuity with a ten-year guaranteed period. Using the standard 4 percent
AIR results in an initial annual payment of about $6,680 per $100,000 in
assets converted. If instead, we use a 0 percent AIR, the initial payment
would be $4,181; using a 6 percent AIR generates an initial payment of
$8,076. Suppose in the following year, the actual return of the CREF fund
were 6 percent. Then the annuities with 0 percent, 4 percent, and 6 percent
AIR would get a 6 percent, 2 percent, and 0 percent increase, respectively.
Given its experience, CREF uses the 4 percent AIR to accomplish the overall
goals of sufficient initial income with some potential for increases that can
help keep pace with inflation.
How effective has the 4 percent AIR been in achieving these goals? The
answer depends on the date of annuity settlement. Figure 8.4 shows the
evolution of payments per initial $1,000 income from a variable annuity
using the CREF stock account. We show paths for cohorts with settlement
dates in ten-year intervals from 1955 to 1985, noting that the horizontal axis
shows years from settlement and not standardized years. For example, the
twentieth year payment for the 1965 cohort is equivalent to the initial year
payment for 1985 cohort. The $1,000 line represents a perfectly inflation-
hedged annuity. For most cohorts, a variable annuity using the CREF stock
account has done well in keeping pace with inflation, on average. This was
particularly true for cohorts with settlement dates after 1980.
Recent Participant Experience in the
TIAA-CREF System
The TIAA-CREF system has undergone substantial change over the past
25 years. Prior to 1989, TIAA-CREF could be considered a pure co-operative
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hybrid system. Participants had only a simple investment menu of two
choices—TIAA and CREF Stock—when deciding how to allocate contribu-
tions and assets. During that time, the TIAA-CREF system also offered a
single form of retirement benefit: the immediate life annuity. Today, by
contrast, participants can choose from an investment menu that includes
mutual funds along with CREF variable annuity funds and the TIAA Trad-
itional fixed annuity. Participants have a wide range of non-annuity income
distribution options including Systematic Withdrawals and Transfers
(SWAT), Minimum Distribution Options (MDO), Transfer Payout Annu-
ities (TPA), and Interest Payment Retirement Options (IPRO).23 Moreover,
participants can choose from a menu of variable and guaranteed fixed
annuities. So to participants, while the system today retains components of
the co-operative hybrid system, it also offers more flexibility during both the
accumulation and distribution phases.
Participation patterns have also changed over time. Table 8.6 shows asset
class participation and proportion of contributions invested from 1993
to 2013. Here, participation rates are split between people who allocated
all contributions to an asset class (100 percent), and those who allocated
a fraction of contributions to an asset class (0.1 percent to 99 percent).
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Figure 8.4 Real CREF stock annuity payments for various cohorts
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In 1993, the investment menu was limited to TIAA and five CREF funds;
then, 81 percent of participants contributed to TIAA, 77 percent contrib-
uted to CREF equity accounts, and around 28 percent contributed to CREF
fixed income accounts. As the investment menu expanded, the proportion
of participants allocating any contributions to TIAA declined, and in 2013,
only about 40 percent contributed to TIAA. As noted in Rugh (2004), equity
class participation peaked in the early 2000s and steadily declined since the
2001 recession. This drop in participation in the guaranteed and equity
classes has been offset by a strong increase in participation in the multi-asset
class, a shift almost completely attributable to increasingly strong participa-
tion in auto-diversified life cycle fund investments first offered in 2004
(Richardson 2014).
Figure 8.5 shows initial income choices by TIAA-CREF participants over
the 1988–2012 period. As discussed earlier, 1988 was the last year that the
TIAA-CREF could be considered a true hybrid system. Among participants
choosing an income stream that year, about 56 percent opted for a joint
table 8.6 Asset class participation and proportion of contributions invested from
1993 to 2013
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2013
TIAA guaranteed
100% 16.1 11.2 6.7 7.5 6.2 4.9 5.7 5.1
0.1–99% 65.2 56.5 48.5 54.8 56.6 49.6 41.0 34.9
Equity
100% 11.5 22.2 29.6 20.0 11.3 8.9 7.6 7.3
0.1–99% 65.2 61.8 55.8 61.9 67.7 62.4 53.2 46.9
Fixed income
100% 3.8 4.2 5.4 6.8 8.9 8.2 8.6 8.2
0.1–99% 24.5 23.8 25.2 26.0 34.1 37.1 34.0 29.6
Real estate
100% – 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6
0.1–99% – 0.7 9.0 26.5 39.9 39.8 32.9 29.9
Multi-asset*
100% – – – – 1.2 10.7 20.1 27.6
50.1–99% – – – – 13.6 14.3 13.6 13.3
81.3 67.7 55.2 62.3 62.8 54.5 46.7 40.0
76.7 84.0 85.4 81.9 79.0 71.3 60.8 54.2
28.3 28.0 30.6 32.8 43.0 45.3 42.6 37.8
0.7 9.1 26.7 40.3 40.2 33.2 30.5
14.8 25.0 33.7 40.9
Notes : Analyses prior to 2005 included the CREF Social Choice fund in the Equity Class.
Sources : Americks (2002), Rugh (2004), Richardson (2014), and authors’ calculations.
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life annuity and 44 percent a single life annuity. Over the next eight years,
TIAA-CREF expanded the distribution menu. In 1989, the Interest Payment
Retirement Option (IPRO), which allows participants to receive interest
income from their TIAA asset accumulations, became the first non-annuity
payment option offered by TIAA-CREF. The Minimum Distribution Option
(MDO) was first offered in 1991 to help retirees satisfy their federally
required minimum distributions. In 1996, Systematic Withdrawals and
Transfers (SWAT) were automated. Figure 8.5 shows that SWATs and
MDOs in particular have become relatively popular initial distribution
choices, now accounting for over 50 percent of new income distribution.
Figure 8.5 also shows that the decline in first-time annuitization rates was
strongly correlated with long-term interest rates. We also note the drop in
demand for joint life relative to single life annuities. Moreover, the demand
for IPROs, in which a participant receives the interest payment from the
annual crediting rate while leaving the asset untouched, has been sensitive
to declines in market interest rates. While the relative demand for annuities
has fallen within the TIAA-CREF system, the proportion of new retirees
annuitizing part of their retirement wealth remains high relative to
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experience in the broader economy; only about 10 percent of workers
leaving their job after age 65 annuitize any assets (Burman et al. 2004).
Conclusion
In theory, hybrid retirement plans can combine the best features of DB and
DC plans. Co-operative pensions are designed to provide adequate risk
sharing and treat different age cohorts fairly. These plans can provide an
efficient and equitable method of ensuring the retirement security of work-
ers. Nevertheless, few private sector workers are currently covered by these
types of plan. The TIAA-CREF system, which began in 1918 and covers
millions of workers in the non-profit sector, provides an example of how to
incorporate features of hybrid, co-operative pensions into a retirement plan
design. The hybrid features, along with an expanded menu of investment
and distribution choices, provide participants withmore flexibility. Theymay
also result in workers and retirees increasing their retirement risk exposure.
Nevertheless, many participants continue to customize their portfolios by
including TIAA Traditional and CREF in their retirement planning.
Particularly for a mobile workforce, including hybrid products like TIAA
Traditional within a DC plan investment menu can provide greater retire-
ment security than a plan structure with a primary DB plan and supplemen-
tal DC plan. This is especially true for individuals who stop working early,
‘job hop,’ and have short life expectancy. Participants who allocate part of
their contributions to a co-operative hybrid product will benefit from the
risk pooling and full interest experience of the annuity.
Much work remains to be done to help current and future retirees make
more effective retirement income and estate planning decisions. One area
for future research is to apply lessons from behavioral finance to retirement
plan distribution design. More work is also needed to better understand how
to frame annuity choices and prices in a way that participants understand
the trade-offs and consequences of their decisions. The next generation of
life cycle products might also incorporate hybrid features helping partici-
pants diversify risk and enhance retirement security, both to and through
retirement.
Endnotes
1. Department of Labor (2013) data indicate that, for private sector workers,
defined contribution (DC) plan participation first surpassed defined benefit
(DB) plan participation in 1992. There were more than twice as many total DC
participants as DB participants and more than four times as many active DC
participants in 2011.
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2. Benartzi and Thaler (2007) provide a good overview on how behavior biases may
affect retirement. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) discuss the importance of finan-
cial literacy to improving decision-making.
3. Many of the institutions within the TIAA-CREF system have multiple retirement
plans and the system includes 401(a), 401(k), 403(b), 415, and 457 type plans.
4. See Greenough (1990) and the TIAA-CREF website.
5. A guaranteed interest rate of 3 percent is applied to all premiums remitted since
1979. When declared, additional amounts remain in effect for a twelve-month
period beginning March 1 of each year. Some newer contracts have an index
guarantee rate that can be between 1 percent and 3 percent.
6. Previous studies by Ameriks (2000) and Rugh (2004) did not consider this a
distinct asset class.
7. Or a participant may choose to transfer part of their existing stock of other
retirement investment assets into TIAA.
8. There are actually eight versions of TIAA which differ primarily by type of
retirement plan. The versions vary by guaranteed return and liquidity of the
asset. Generally, the greater the liquidity of the account, the lower the guaran-
teed minimum rate of return.
9. A certainty period guarantees payment for a specific number of years regardless
of annuitant mortality. Because the payment can be made as a lump sum at
annuitant’s death, it is akin to a declining value term life insurance policy.
10. The length of the TPA period will depend on which version of TIAA the
participant holds. The typical transfer period is ten payments over nine years
and one day. Some employers’ plans do not allow TPAs.
11. The guarantee is determined by the five-year Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT)
less 125 basis points with a minimum bound of 1 percent and a maximum
guarantee of 3 percent.
12. This is especially true since the early 1980s.
13. $100  1.0310 = $134.39; 100 * 1.05 * 1.039 = 137.
14. We reduce the Barclays return by 18 basis points as a proxy for bond fund
expenses.
15. Participants can log into their accounts on the TIAA-CREF website and see their
current TIAA accumulations by vintage as well as their overall average earning
rate.
16. The annuity settlement crediting rate is the interest rate used, in conjunction
with the mortality rate assumption, to determine the amount of income an
annuity generates.
17. ‘Contingency reserves’ are rainy day funds, and all insurers need to have some
level of these reserves. These reserves come from the spread that companies earn
on the money invested.
18. The latter option is similar to a ten-year annuity certain.
19. Guaranteed minimum rates have been fairly stable through this period.
20. See Benartzi and Thaler (2007) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2014).
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21. See Benartzi et al. (2011) for a discussion of annuity puzzles.
22. See Greenough (1990) for a discussion of the creation of CREF.
23. See Ameriks (2002) for a discussion of different income distribution options.
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